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In the aftermath of the second Greek bailout, Kevin Featherstone argues that the EU
and IMF are obsessed with Greece’s budget balance and are taking little regard for
the domestic impacts of austerity.
Who is rescued by the bailouts of the European debt crisis? The question won’t go
away. Last month, Greece was granted a second bailout in order to avoid a
catastrophic disorderly default. Few observers believe it will be enough to avoid the
need for a third bailout, at least in the medium term. It wasn’t supposed to be like
this: Greece’s first bailout almost two years ago was to be a one-off; more recently, EU leaders have
repeatedly insisted that there would be no repeat of its second package. Once again, they appear King
Canute-like: whatever their claims, they cannot turn back the waves of scepticism from the markets.
The Greek banks – vital to the provision of new investment in an economy facing a sixth year of
continuous recession – have certainly not been “rescued”. The haircuts on the Greek debt of 53%,
imposed in the name of PSI (private sector involvement), have severely damaged them, but this is
compounded by their losses of about a further 20% on the new bonds they were forced to accept. The
banks now face large-scale nationalisation. So, a sector that has only in the last two decades been
freed to operate as private institutions and has shown a vibrancy for growth and foreign takeovers
unmatched in other parts of the Greek economy, is now to be returned to the hands of a political class
lambasted for its lack of economic discipline. How this might be a stimulus to a more competitive
economy is decidedly unclear.
There are starker social costs, of course. In an economy without a welfare regime to speak of, the
impact of five consecutive years of recession has taken its toll. Charitable foundations that used to fund
educational programmes have taken a big hit themselves in their bank deposits and have now shifted
to paying for soup kitchens on the streets of Athens. Neighbourhoods are marked by buildings that
owners are desperate to sell or rent and a major increase in the homeless sleeping rough. Almost half
of Greece’s young people are unemployed, as are one in five of their older peers. Despondency is
everywhere, despite the “rescue”. If future Greek governments keep to the terms of the bailout, by 2020
public debt will be back to what is was when the crisis erupted in 2009.
The problem is in how Greece is being rescued. The bailouts have increasingly shifted to the
imposition of severe cuts across the board. In the past two years, Greece has implemented a reduction
of its budget deficit unprecedented not only in the EU, but in the entire OECD area. But the new terms
insist on the sacking of 15,000 public servants each year for the next 10 years. The number has been
arrived at purely from the budget constraint.
I know from my own involvement with Greek policymaking in the area of research policy that the bailout
constraint is being imposed as a series of short-term fixes, eschewing efforts at long-term planning.
Crucially, there is no steer or stimulus here as to how the Greek system should be remodelled in order
to shift to a better path of development. The obsession is with the budget balance, not with selectivity or
design. The political effect at home is to create a simplistic divide between those for or against
austerity, rather than leading a substantive debate on real structural reforms.
With such a charge, the EU and IMF representatives – composing the troika overseeing the Greek
bailout – march into ministerial offices on a weekly basis to check that the targets are being met. These
second- or third-level officials bask in their unprecedented authority. Stories abound of them walking
into meetings with senior ministers, discarding the niceties of a polite greeting, and shouting
straightaway, “So, what have you achieved, then?” Young bureaucrats from Brussels lead meetings
with ministers ostentatiously giving scant attention to the oral reports offered to them, as they turn
sideways and play with their BlackBerrys. In the name of “Europe”, neo-colonial arrogance underscores
the fixation with the budget accounts.
A real rescue requires a serious engagement with remodelling Greece. And this must recognise that a
culture changes gradually, needing long-term support. But the “rescue” of the Greek economy is taking
place with little regard to its domestic impacts: it could hardly be more ham-fisted. This inevitably begs
a question not only of European capability, but also of will. Has the intention shifted: not to rescue
Greece, but to rescue Europe from it? Athenians might well turn the aphorism around and warn their
partners in Lisbon: “Beware of Europeans bearing gifts.”
* This piece first appeared in The Guardian ‘Comment is free’ column (22 March 2012) and on the
Greece@LSE blog.
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